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Abstract
The linkages between inﬂation and the economy’s cyclical position are thought to be strongly
affected by the credibility of monetary authorities. The author complements existing research by
estimating a small forward-looking model of the U.S. economy with endogenous central bank
credibility. His work differs from the existing literature in several ways. First, he endogenizes and
estimates credibility parameters, allowing inﬂation expectations to be a mix of backward- and
forward-looking agents. Second, his models include both outcome- and action-based credibility.
Third, he estimates a non-linear relation between policy credibility and divergences of inﬂation
from target, which is also assumed to change over history. Finally, the author’s non-linear time-
varying credibility indexes do not rely on a two-regime deﬁnition, but on a continuum of
credibility regimes. The author ﬁnds strong, stable, and statistically signiﬁcant outcome- and
action-credibility effects that generate important inﬂation inertia. According to his results, the
value of the endogenous credibility indexes has risen steadily across the different monetary policy
regimes.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, C32
Bank classiﬁcation: Transmission of monetary policy; Econometric and statistical methods;
Inﬂation and prices
Résumé
Le crédit dont jouissent les autorités monétaires inﬂuerait fortement sur la relation entre l’inﬂation
et la position de l’économie dans le cycle. En complément des recherches existantes, l’auteur
estime un petit modèle prospectif de l’économie américaine où la crédibilité de la banque centrale
est endogène. Son approche se démarque de plusieurs façons de celle de ses prédécesseurs. Tout
d’abord, l’auteur endogénéise et estime des paramètres de crédibilité en postulant que les
anticipations d’inﬂation traduisent le fait que certains agents ont un comportement adaptatif et
d’autres un comportement prospectif. Deuxièmement, il intègre dans ses modèles deux types de
crédibilité : l’une fondée sur les résultats obtenus par les autorités monétaires dans le passé et
l’autre sur les effets anticipés de leur action. Troisièmement, il estime une relation non linéaire
entre la crédibilité de la politique monétaire et les écarts de l’inﬂation par rapport à son niveau
cible, lequel varie par hypothèse dans le temps. Enﬁn, l’auteur a recours à des indices de
crédibilité non dichotomiques, qui peuvent prendre un continuum de valeurs. Il observe des effets
de crédibilité probants, stables et statistiquement signiﬁcatifs qui induisent une forte inertie de
l’inﬂation. D’après ses résultats, la valeur des indices de crédibilité endogène a augmenté
continuellement sous les différents régimes de politique monétaire.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E52, C32
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Transmission de la politique monétaire; Méthodes économétriques
et statistiques; Inﬂation et prix1
1. Introduction
The linkages between inﬂation and the economy’s cyclical position are thought to be strongly
affected by the credibility of monetary authorities. When conﬁdence in the central bank’s ability
to maintain its nominal anchor is high, inﬂation expectations should react less to demand shocks.
Given its endogenous nature, the credibility of monetary policy is difﬁcult to model and introduce
into both the inﬂation-generating process and the transmission mechanism. Notwithstanding these
difﬁculties, there are reasons to believe that high policy credibility may partly explain the stability
and the low level of inﬂation observed during the second half of the 1990s, despite the ﬂuctuation
of the output gap. This outcome may be the result of a shift to a monetary regime characterized by
greater policy credibility.
This paper, like most of the literature, addresses this issue in the context of a Phillips curve.
Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (1998) examine different disinﬂation strategies in the context of
endogenous credibility. They deﬁne two concepts of credibility: outcome and action credibility.
Outcome credibility is a backward-looking concept in which agents assign a high degree of
credibility to the monetary authority if it has recently succeeded in meeting its nominal target (i.e.,
inﬂation target). Action credibility is a forward-looking concept in which agents assign credibility
if they expect that the central bank will take necessary actions to meet its nominal target in the
future. Therefore, outcome credibility relies on the past gap between inﬂation and its target,
whereas action credibility relies on the gap between expected inﬂation and the target. Although
interesting, Bomﬁm and Rudebusch’s paper only postulates that credibility effects exist, rather
than test for them. They also assume that the link between credibility and the distance of inﬂation
from its target is linear. Finally, they suppose that credibility is based either on outcomes or
actions, but not on a combination of the two.
Isard, Laxton, and Eliasson (2001) estimate a small macro model with endogenous policy
credibility. In their model, agents evaluate the probability of being in a regime where long-term
inﬂation is anchored to the target relative to a situation where inﬂation expectations are anchored
to a higher level of inﬂation. They have a different forecasting rule for the two regimes. Laxton
and N’Diaye (2002) estimate models for 17 industrialized countries with endogenous monetary
policy designs in a fashion similar to Isard, Laxton, and Eliasson (2001). These models are
backward looking and the level of credibility is based on long-run interest rates.
The goal of this paper is to complement existing research by estimating a small forward-looking
model of the U.S. economy with endogenous central bank credibility. This paper differs from the
existing literature in several ways. First, I endogenize and estimate credibility parameters,
allowing inﬂation expectations to be a mix of backward-looking and forward-looking agents.2
Second, my models include both outcome- and action-based credibility. Third, I estimate a non-
linear relation between policy credibility and divergences of inﬂation from target, which is also
assumed to change over history. Finally, the non-linear time-varying credibility indexes presented
in this paper do not rely on a two-regime deﬁnition, but on a continuum of credibility regimes.M y
goal is not to ﬁnd the best Phillips curve in terms of forecasting capability, but to ﬁnd evidence of
endogenous credibility. In particular, I seek to identify the impact of outcome and action
credibility on the linkages between inﬂation and the economy’s cyclical position.
In my Phillips curve, endogenous credibility is inserted into inﬂation expectations that are a mix
of backward- and forward-looking agents. Inﬂation expectations are partly a function of a time-
varying weight on the inﬂation target, which ﬂuctuates between 0 and 1. This time-varying weight
is a function of the gap between inﬂation expectations and the inﬂation target. The link between
this gap and credibility is highly non-linear; small gaps have only a small impact on credibility,
and large and persistent deviations of inﬂation expectations from the target can push the
credibility index to zero.
My results show strong, stable, and statistically signiﬁcant outcome- and action-credibility effects
that generate important inflation inertia. Inflation reacts weakly to movements of less than
2 percentage points in the output gap, and the link between inﬂation and the output gap is highly
non-linear. According to my results, there is a non-zero explicit weight on the inﬂation target in
inﬂation expectations for the recent and/or expected gap between the inﬂation rate and its target of
up to 0.8 percentage points (in the case of the consumption deﬂator), and 1.5 percentage points (in
the case of the GDP deﬂator). Persistent differences between inﬂation and its target above these
values eliminate all policy credibility. In these circumstances, the monetary authority must
respond aggressively to return inﬂation to its target and rebuild its credibility at the cost of lost
output and higher variance of key macro variables. According to the results, the value of the
endogenous credibility indexes has risen steadily across the different monetary policy regimes.
These key results are generally robust to several factors: the estimation period; the speciﬁcation of
the form of credibility (outcome or both outcome and action); the choice of dates of breaks in the
level of the nominal anchor; the measure of inﬂation (consumption excluding food and energy or
GDP deﬂators); and the choice of key disequilibrium variables introduced into the Phillips curve
(output or NAIRU1 gaps).
To draw conclusions on the policy implications of this paper, I would have to generate an
optimum monetary policy rule consistent with the Phillips curve presented in this paper. That is
left for future research. Nevertheless, I draw the following conclusions for monetary authorities:
1. NAIRU: Non-accelerating-inﬂation rate of unemployment.3
• Monetary autorities should account for a potentialy non-linear relationship between inﬂation
and its determinants. As a consequence, linear Phillips curves are likely, ceteris paribus, to
overreact to small shocks (to the output gap, price of oil, or exchange rate) and underreact to
large shocks. The impact on inﬂation strongly depends on the conditions under which the
shock occurs.
• Even if credibility is very high, central banks should react to any types of shock that affect
inﬂation expectations in order to protect their credibility. The size of the reaction depends
strongly on the conditions under which the shock occurs, and on the size and the persistence
of the shock. Consider the example of a positive shock to the output gap: if initial credibility is
high, the impact on real interest rates will be smaller than if credibility is low when the shock
occurs. In the latter case, the monetary authority has to sharply raise real interest rates to
regain credibility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve,
including the different credibility indexes and inﬂation expectations. Sections 3 and 4 describe the
IS curve and the reaction function used for simulation purposes only. Sections 5 and 6 show
estimation and simulation results, respectively, and section 7 concludes.
2. The Phillips Curve with Endogenous Credibility
I assume a standard Phillips curve, in which inﬂation is a function of expected inﬂation, the output
gap, changes in the real effective exchange rate, and changes in real oil prices2:
. (1)
With the exception of expected inﬂation, the regressors could include both lagged and
contemporaneous values.
I assume a constant share of backward-looking agents, , and a constant share, , of
forward-looking agents. Therefore, inﬂation expectations can be rewritten as follows:
. (2)
Backward-looking agents assign a time-varying weight, , to the monetary authority’s inﬂation
target, , in forming their expectations. Therefore, the weight on the recent inﬂation rate is
:
2. The output gap used is derived using the methodology of Gosselin and Lalonde (2003). Their approach
consists of combining the equilibrium paths generated bya Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter and a structural
vectorautoregression (SVAR) for labour input and labour productivity. I use the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation-adjusted major currencies index for the real exchange rate.
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The time-varying weight, , on the inﬂation target ﬂuctuates between 0 and 1 (see equation (4)).
It is a function of the moving average of the gap between recent inﬂation and the target (equation
(5)), and has the following speciﬁcation:
, (4)
. (5)
The closer the inﬂation rate is to the target, the greater the weight placed on the inﬂation target in
expected inﬂation. This is outcome credibility, since it depends on the central bank’s ability to
meet the inﬂation target in the past. The time-varying credibility index ( ) can be interpreted as
the probability that the backward-looking agents expect the monetary policy to meet its target in
the near future. The functional form of the credibility index has several implications:
• It is symmetric: the direction of deviation of inﬂation from its target does not affect the loss of
credibility.
• A small deviation of inﬂation from the target will have less negative consequences on credibi-
lity than a more substantial departure.
• The ﬁeld of application of credibility depends critically on the estimated coefﬁcient, .3 For
instance, Figure A1 of Appendix A shows that, if , a persistent deviation of more
than 0.8 percentage points of inﬂation relative to the target would reduce the weight on the tar-
get to practically 0. If , the same threshold is located at a deviation of 1.5 percentage
points around the target.
Given equations (2) and (3), the weight on the target in inﬂation expectations equals:
. (6)
Finally, inﬂation expectations of the forward-looking agents are model-consistent:
3. If the credibility parameter isclose to zero, then the credibility index will be different from 0 and equal
to 1 only when there is no gap between the inﬂation expectation and the target. Furthermore, once




























Since backward-looking agents assign some weight to the target, forward-looking agents
indirectly put some weight on the target in the formulation of their expectations, because the
model-consistent forecast incorporates the behaviour of backward-looking agents. In other words,
rational agents must take into account the fact that the backward-looking agents place some
weight on the target in their expectations.
It is also possible to directly introduce a weight on the target in the forward-looking expectations.
In this case, the type of credibility is called “action credibility,” because it depends on the ability
of the monetary authority to take the action in order to meet its target in the future. Consequently:
. (8)
The time-varying weight, , on the inﬂation target has the same functional form as the outcome
credibility (equation (9)). It is a function of a moving average of the gap between the expected
inﬂation rate over the next 4 quarters and the target (equation (10)):
, (9)
. (10)
The action-credibility parameter index, , can be interpreted as the probability that the forward-
looking agents expect the monetary policy to meet its target in the next 4 quarters.
Combining outcome and action credibility creates a total credibility index, which is also the
weight on the target in inﬂation expectations. The total credibility index is equal to:
. (11)
Thus, the total credibility index ( ) can be interpreted as the probability that all economic
agents place on the monetary authorities meeting its target in the near future.
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3. The IS Curve
To simulate shocks and examine the behaviour of the economy with endogenous credibility, I
estimate an IS curve that captures the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Similar to
Gosselin and Lalonde (2003),4 I use the following speciﬁcation:
, (12)
where and are the growth rates of GDP and potential GDP, respectively. Therefore, for
a parameter, , less than 1, this IS curve features a gradual adjustment of demand to a shock to
potential GDP. Monetary policy is one of the mechanisms by which the level of GDP converges to
the level of potential GDP. This is done via the second lag of the real federal funds interest rate
gap ( ).5 The equilibrium real interest rate ( ) is constant. To account for
missing variables or any other adjustment mechanisms that make the level of GDP converge to the
level of potential GDP, I introduce a cointegration term between output and potential output into
the equation ( ).6
4. The Reaction Function
To do simulations and to fully capture the monetary policy transmission mechanism, I use the
reaction function estimated by English, Nelson, and Sack (2002).7 Aside from being forward
looking, a necessary condition in this model, this reaction function has many interesting features.
First, the monetary authority targets a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule, as in equation
(13). Second, it deviates from that rule for two different reasons: because uncertainty surrounding
the future path of the economy leads the monetary authority to smooth the proﬁle of interest rates
given by the forward-looking Taylor rule (equation (14)), and because the monetary authority
4. Murchison (2001) uses a similar speciﬁcation.
5. The use of the second lag may reﬂect the lag associated withthe monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
6. Simulations done with the new Bank of Canada U.S.projection model (MUSE, for Model of the U.S.
Economy)inwhichoutputisdisaggregatedgenerateessentiallythesameresultsasthoseobtainedwith
this simple IS curve. Thisresult indicates that the coefﬁcient of the lagged output gap provides a good
approximationoftheadjustmentmechanismsotherthantheendogenousresponseofmonetarypolicy.It
also indicates that the monetary policy transmission mechanism is well captured.
7. I also performed simulations using a simpler reaction function that I have estimated. In this reaction
function, the gap between the real interest rate and its equilibrium isa function of the ﬁrst lag (i.e.,
smoothing), the contemporaneous output gap, and the gap between inﬂation expected in4 quarters (as
captured by a survey done by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) and the target. Results were
almost identical.
Dyt fDy*t 1 f – () D yt 1 – Wygapt 1 – – ¶ rfedt 2 – rfed* – () – + =
Dyt Dy*t
f
rfedt 2 – rfed* – rfed*
ygapt 1 –7
often takes unobserved factors, other than the inﬂation and output gaps, into account when
making policy decisions. These factors can contaminate the estimation of a rule that includes only
inﬂation and output gaps. English, Nelson, and Sack therefore introduce autocorrelated errors
(equation (15)) to represent these deviations. Finally, according to their results, the monetary
authority places more weight on a deviation of inﬂation from its target than on a deviation of





5.1 The Phillips curve
To consider the case of outcome credibility, I substitute equations (2), (3), and (4) into equation
(1) to obtain:
. (16)
Parameters , , , , and are to be estimated. As a proxy for the forward-looking inﬂation
expectations, I use the results of the Inﬂation Expectations Survey conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. To test and identify historical shifts of inﬂation targets, I use a Bai-
Perron test for endogenous structural breaks. The test identiﬁes two breaks: the ﬁrst in 1983Q1
and the second in 1992Q4 (see Appendix B). Instead of having a complex lag structure, I use
moving averages for the output gap, the real effective exchange rate, and the real price of oil.8 Key
results are almost unaffected by the use of moving averages. In the case of the GDP deﬂator, the
8. Movingaveragesof4,5,and2lagswereusedfortheoutputgap,theexchangerate,andthepriceofoil,
respectively.
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output gap is simply introduced in time t. Finally, given the non-linear nature of this equation, I
estimate equation (16) using non-linear least squares. For the case of combined outcome and
action credibility, I substitute equations (2), (3), (4), (8), and (9) into equation (1) to obtain:
(17)
Tables 1 and 2 show the estimation results for equations (16) and (17) for the historical periods
1972Q3–2003Q4 and 1979Q3–2003Q4, respectively. These periods are chosen because they
show the whole post–Bretton Woods era, 1972Q3–2003Q4, and the Volcker-Greenspan period,
1979Q3–2003Q4. I provide results for two inﬂation measures: the consumption deﬂator
(excluding food and energy) and the GDP deﬂator. Because of residual autocorrelation problems,
I do not provide results for the regressions using the GDP deﬂator during the whole post–Bretton
Woods period, 1972Q3–2003Q4 (Table 1). Aside from that case, there is no autocorrelation in the
residuals. Using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, all the regressors are
introduced in time t.
All the coefﬁcients have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. For the two estimation
periods, results show that the value of the output-gap parameter ( ) is between 0.11 and 0.13 for
the consumption deﬂator and equal to 0.22 for the GDP deﬂator.9 Given the larger variance of the
GDP deﬂator compared with the core consumption deﬂator, this result was expected. As
predicted, the parameter on the real effective exchange rate ( ) has a negative sign and the
coefﬁcient associated with the real price of oil ( ) has a positive sign. For the consumption
deﬂator, the share of the backward-looking agents ( ) is around 75 per cent for the post–Bretton
Woods period as a whole, and between 56 and 58 per cent for the Volcker-Greenspan period. For
the GDP deﬂator, this share is 66 per cent.
The key credibility parameter ( ) is roughly equal to 0.25 for the consumption deﬂator (for both
the post–Bretton Woods and Volcker-Greenspan periods) and between 0.38 and 0.48 for the GDP
deﬂator. The ﬁnding that the credibility parameter is larger for the GDP deﬂator was expected,
given the larger variance of the GDP deﬂator than the core consumption deﬂator. The GDP





















































































































































deﬂator credibility parameter is 72 per cent higher than the one obtained with the core
consumption deﬂator. Furthermore, the output-gap parameter associated with the GDP deﬂator is
66 per cent higher than with the case of the consumption deﬂator. Consequently, a shock to the
output gap will have almost the same effect on the time-varying credibility index ( ) in both
price deﬂators. The higher credibility parameter is almost perfectly cancelled by a higher output-
gap parameter.
The credibility parameters are almost unaffected by the assumption I make on the type of
credibility (outcome credibility or combined outcome and action credibility). I ﬁnd the biggest
difference for the GDP deﬂator (0.38 vs. 0.48). Finally, as Appendix C shows, the key parameters
are very stable across the last inﬂation-target regime (1992Q4–2003Q4). The results are
qualitatively the same if I introduce the two permanent changes in the inﬂation target up to 8
quarters before the date given by the Bai-Perron structural break tests. Concerning outcome
credibility, results are also almost unaffected if I exclude the forward-looking agents from the
model (when beta is equal to 1).
Table 1: Phillips Curve Estimation (1972Q3–2003Q4)
Parameters Estimated coefﬁcients
(T-statistic)















































To summarize, I ﬁnd an important and statistically robust credibility effect. In the case of the
consumption deﬂator, equals 0.25 and equals 0.6. A persistent deviation of more than
0.8 percentage points of inﬂation relative to the target will make the credibility index almost equal
to zero, as shown by the solid line in Figure A1 of Appendix A. Once the inﬂation rate
expectation deviates by more than 0.5 percentage points from the target, the value of the time-
varying credibility index is nevertheless very small. Thus, the zone where monetary policy has a
“quasi” free lunch is fairly small. The zone is somewhat larger in the case of the GDP deﬂator,
shown by the dashed line in Figure A1 of Appendix A, but the variance of the GDP deﬂator is also
bigger than the variance of the core consumption deﬂator. In that case, equals 0.48 and
equals 0.66, and I ﬁnd that a persistent deviation of more than 1.5 percentage points (instead of
0.8) of inﬂation relative to the target will make the credibility index almost zero. Nevertheless,
once the inﬂation rate deviates by more than 1.0 percentage point from the target (instead of 0.5),
the weight on the target is negligible.
Table 2: Phillips Curve Estimation (1979Q3–2003Q4)
Parameters Estimated coefﬁcients
(T-statistic)
Outcome credibility Outcome and action credibilities






























































Figure A2 of Appendix A shows the historical path of the outcome credibility index based on the
consumption deﬂator. As estimated, the key credibility parameter ( ) is ﬁxed at 0.25 per cent. As
expected, before 1982, credibility is very low. I also ﬁnd that the credibility index is quite variable
across history.10 Recall that the credibility index corresponds to the probability that the monetary
authority will meet its target in the near future, not at the steady state. Nevertheless, simulation
results provided in section 6 show that, even if equals 0.25, the impact of endogenous
credibility on the economy is very important. The credibility index becomes more stable once I
introduce both outcome and action credibility together. The results are shown in Figure A3 of
Appendix A: the GDP deﬂator action- and outcome-credibility index (i.e., ) is less
volatile, because both the forward- and backward-looking agents put some explicit time-varying
weights on the inﬂation target.
Table 3 shows that the average values of the credibility indexes have risen steadily across the
different monetary policy regimes. The average value of the action- and outcome-credibility index
(i.e., ), computed with the GDP deﬂator, was 0.21 between 1972Q2 and 1979Q2. During
the Volcker period, the index rose by 71 per cent to reach 0.36. Finally, since Greenspan has been
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the index has risen by another
102 per cent and equalled, on average, 0.73. To a lesser extent, I ﬁnd similar results for the
outcome credibility index computed with the consumption deﬂator. Table 3 also shows that,
during the second half of the 1990s, the so-called U.S. miracle period, monetary policy credibility
was very high.
10. The variability of the credibility index depends critically onthe value of the credibility parameter ( ).
With a value of 0.25, as in the case of the consumption deﬂator, any persistent deviation of the inﬂation
expectationfromthetargetlargerthan0.50percentagepointwilldropthevalueoftheindextolessthan
0.1, close to the minimal value. Such episodes occurred even in the post-1996 period, but they were not
verypersistent.
Table 3: Evolution of Credibility Indexes (see Appendix B)
Period Average value of credibility indexes
GDP deﬂator












5.2 The IS curve
Table 4 reports results of the small IS curve. Despite the simplicity of the IS curve, the is
surprisingly high and there is no correlation in the residuals. The results conﬁrm that demand
adjusts gradually to a shock to potential output ( ). The coefﬁcient of the real interest
rate gap is highly signiﬁcant and negative. The fact that the coefﬁcient associated with the lag of
the output gap is negative and statistically signiﬁcant means that there are factors other than
monetary policy that make the level of real GDP converge to the level of potential GDP. The
gradual adjustment of wages and prices, the real exchange rate, and ﬁscal policy could be among
those factors. Therefore, aside from ﬁscal policy, it is fair to say that these factors are mainly
linked to market-driven/endogenous adjustment mechanisms.
6. Simulations
The purpose of the simulations presented in this section is to analyze the impact of non-linear
endogenous credibility on the behaviour of inﬂation, the interest rate, and the output gap. More
speciﬁcally, I seek to answer the following questions:
• Given the non-linear feature of endogenous credibility, what deviation of output from poten-
tial is needed to induce a large deviation of inﬂation from the target? What size of shock is
needed to signiﬁcantly reduce credibility? In that context, how much larger does the monetary
reaction need to be to restore credibility, and at what price, in terms of deviation of output and
inﬂation from their targets?
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• With high initial credibility, what deviations of output from potential are relatively benign for
inﬂation?
• When the initial level of credibility is high, does the monetary authority need to react to a
small shock to the output gap?
This section is divided into three subsections. The ﬁrst deals with some calibration issues. The
second reports the results. The last addresses some issues regarding the speciﬁcation of the IS
curve.
6.1 Calibration
To simulate the model, I set the values of the key parameters (see Table 5). I calibrate the model
according to the results obtained with the consumption deﬂator because it is the price deﬂator that
the Federal Reserve focuses on. As stated in the previous section, if the model was calibrated
based on the estimates of the GDP deﬂator model, the conclusion would be almost identical,
because the larger coefﬁcient of the output gap in the Phillips curve would almost perfectly offset
the higher credibility parameter. Consequently, a shock to the output gap will have almost the
same effect on the time-varying credibility index in both price deﬂators.
Based on the estimation results in Tables 1 and 2, the share of backward-looking agents is set to
60 per cent and the credibility parameter is set to 0.25. I choose an equilibrium real interest rate of
2.8 per cent and an inﬂation target of 2.0 per cent. For the purpose of these simulations, the
calibration of the growth rate of potential GDP is irrelevant. Furthermore, unless I analyze the
issue of a lower nominal interest rate bound, calibration of the equilibrium interest rate and
inﬂation target is also irrelevant.14
6.2 Non-linearity and response of the model to different shocks to the
output gap
This section illustrates the non-linear impacts of endogenous credibility on macroeconomic
outcomes by presenting simulations using output-gap shocks of different sizes in a model that
includes only outcome credibility. The key parameters are calibrated according to the values
reported in Table 5. Appendix D shows the response of the model to a positive, 1 percentage point
shock to the output gap. The economy is initially at steady state, the output gap is equal to 0, the
inﬂation rate and the inﬂation expectation are equal to the target, and the real interest rate is equal
to the equilibrium values. Therefore, before the shock occurs, credibility is perfect (credibility
indexes are equal to 1). These initial conditions explain why the shock to the output gap induces
only a small increase in inﬂation (0.16 per cent). The impact on inﬂation is so small that the
inﬂation rate stays in the high-credibility zone. The monetary authority achieves this result, partly
because of its initial high credibility and also because it protects its credibility by increasing the
real interest rate by close to 75 basis points. Therefore, the 1 per cent shock to the output gap has
only a small negative effect on the credibility index.
Appendix E shows the response of the models to a positive, 2 percentage point shock to the output
gap. This shock pushes the inﬂation rate into a zone that begins to endanger the credibility of the
monetary authority. The credibility index falls by 40 per cent. Appendix F shows the response of
the model to a positive, 3 per cent shock to the output gap. This shock is large enough to push the
inﬂation rate into a zone where the credibility is almost completely lost. The weight on the target


















falls to almost zero. To regain credibility by pushing the inﬂation rate closer to the target, the
monetary authority has to increase the real interest rate by close to 250 basis points.
Appendix G shows that the effect of an output-gap shock on the inﬂation rate is highly non-linear
and strongly depends on the conditions of the economy before the shock occurs. In this appendix,
I show the result of three different simulations. All these simulations illustrate the response of the
model to a positive, 1 per cent shock to the output gap, but they use different initial conditions. In
the ﬁrst simulation (solid lines), the economy is initially at its steady state, the inﬂation rate is
equal to its target, and credibility is at its maximum. The second simulation (dotted lines) starts
with an initial excess demand of 1 per cent and the third (dashed lines) at an initial excess demand
of 2 per cent. Appendix G shows the results for outcome credibility.
For the outcome-credibility model, if the shock to the output gap occurs in a situation where the
economy is at steady state (solid lines) and credibility is high, its impact on inﬂation is small, with
a peak response of only 0.16 per cent. As noted earlier, the monetary authority achieves this result
partly because of its high credibility and also because it protects its credibility by raising the real
interest rate by close to 75 basis points. If the same shock occurs when the economy is already in
excess demand of 2 per cent and credibility is low, the peak response of inﬂation is 0.50 per cent
(instead of 0.16). In this situation, inﬂation is already high relative to the target when the shock
occurs. Therefore, the weight on the target in inﬂation expectations is low. In fact, the shock
further decreases credibility by almost 70 per cent. The monetary authority does not get any “free
lunch.” To regain credibility by pushing the inﬂation rate to a level consistent with the initial
conditions (excess demand of 2 per cent), the monetary authority has to increase the real interest
rate by close to 125 basis points (instead of 75 when the economy is initially at steady state).
6.3 Convergence of the level of real GDP to the level of real potential GDP
In the model, two different channels make real GDP converge to real potential GDP—the
monetary policy and the “natural” adjustment mechanisms—but only monetary policy makes the
inﬂation rate converge to the target. What happens if monetary policy is the only channel by
which both real GDP and inﬂation converge to the steady state? Simulation results shown in
Appendixes H and I try to answer this question. Appendix H shows, using the outcome-credibility
model, the responses of the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the real interest rate to a
1 percentage point shock to the output gap with and without the economy’s “natural” adjustment
mechanisms in effect; i.e., setting or , respectively. Because some adjustment
mechanisms are turned off, and because it takes time for monetary policy to affect output, the
response of the output gap (and therefore the inﬂation rate) to the shock is quite persistent.
W 0.11 – = W 0 =16
Furthermore, because all the adjustment depends on monetary policy, the response of the real
interest rate is also larger and more persistent. Overall, for a shock of that size, the outcome is
nevertheless benign. Even if the “natural” adjustment mechanisms are turned off, the peak
response of inﬂation to a 1 percentage point shock to the output gap is only 0.24 percentage point,
instead of 0.16. The situation is different for a larger shock. Indeed, Appendix I shows that, if I
exclude the natural adjustment mechanisms from the model, a shock of 2 per cent on the output
gap has a bigger impact on inﬂation than a shock of 3 per cent when these mechanisms are
present. Therefore, without natural adjustment mechanisms, the economy can more rapidly reach
the level of deviation of inﬂation from its target where there are important negative effects on the
credibility of the monetary authority.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have found strong, stable, and statistically signiﬁcant outcome- and action-
credibility effects. These effects contribute to creating important inertia and small ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation for cycles of the output gap smaller than about 2 percentage points. Therefore, in these
models the link between inﬂation and the output gap is strongly non-linear. According to my
results, there is a non-zero weight on the target in the inﬂation expectation for a recent and/or
expected gap between the inﬂation rate and the target of up to 0.8 per cent (for the consumption
deﬂator) and 1.5 percentage points (for the GDP deﬂator). Any persistent gap higher than these
values eliminates the credibility effect on inﬂation. In these circumstances, monetary policy will
have to work harder to achieve its target and to rebuild its credibility at a higher cost in terms of
lost output and higher variance of key macro variables. When I allow for joint outcome and action
credibility, I ﬁnd that, during the so-called U.S. miracle period (the second half of the 1990s), the
Federal Reserve Bank’s credibility was very high (0.79 per cent). Given the simulation results
reported in this paper, this could, at least partly, explain why there was an apparent weakening of
the link between the output gap and the inﬂation rate over that period.
Further research needs to be done on the topic of endogenous credibility. First, methods other than
the Bai-Perron endogenous structural break test could be used to identify the historical changes in
inﬂation targets. Second, functional forms other than the normal distribution for the time-varying
weight on the inﬂation target could be used: for example, asymmetric distribution where agents
assign more weight to a positive than to a negative deviation of inﬂation from the target. Third, the
approach used in this paper could be applied within a Neo-Keynesian Phillips curve that is based
on marginal cost instead of the output gap. Finally, it would be interesting to identify the optimal
monetary policy rule that corresponds to the endogenous monetary policy credibility Phillips
curve presented in this paper.17
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Appendix A: Endogenous Credibility Effect
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Figure A2: Consumption Deﬂator: Historical Path of the Credibility Index
(Outcome Credibility)
Figure A3: GDP Deﬂator: Historical Path of the Credibility Index
(Outcome and Action Credibility)

















Appendix B: Bai-Perron Endogenous Structural Break Tests and
the Gap Between the Inﬂation Rate and the Target
Figure B1: Inﬂation Rate and Inﬂation Target
(Bai-Perron Endogenous Structural Break Approach)
Figure B2: Eight Quarters Moving Average of the Gap Between the
Inﬂation Rate and the Target
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Appendix C: Parameter Stability
Figure C1: Parameter Stability (Rolling Regressions, 1992Q4–2002Q3)
Consumption deﬂator (beginning of estimation 1972Q3)
Figure C2: Parameter Stability (Rolling Regressions, 1995Q2–2002Q3)
Consumption deﬂator (beginning of estimation 1979Q3)
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Appendix D: Outcome Credibility
Results from a 1 per cent Demand Shock (All in shock minus control)
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Appendix E: Outcome Credibility
Results from a 2 per cent Demand Shock (All in shock minus control)
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Appendix F: Outcome Credibility
Results from a 3 per cent Demand Shock (All in shock minus control)
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Appendix G: Outcome credibility
Endogenous Credibility Effect, Nonlinearity and Initial Conditions
Results from a 1 per cent Demand Shock (All in shock minus control)
Initial conditions: Solid=Steady state, Dotted=Excess demand of 1%, Dashed: Excess demand of 2%
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Appendix H: The Convergence of the Real Economy (Outcome Credibility)
Results from a 1 per cent Demand Shock (All in Shock Minus Control)
Solid: with the natural adjustment mechanisms
Dotted: without the natural adjustment mechanisms
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Appendix I: The Convergence of the Real Economy (Outcome Credibility)
Solid: Results from a 3 per cent demand Shock (with the natural adjustment mechanisms)
Dotted: Results from a 2 per cent demand Shock (without the natural adjustment mechanisms)
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